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Pension systems in Latin America and the Caribbean are broken. To 
begin with, they cover less than half the population. Moreover, flaws 
in structure and financing make some of them unsustainable, even for 
this limited beneficiary population. The approaching end of the demo-
graphic dividend only magnifies these problems. Since pensions are the 
main vehicle through which households save for retirement, the pension 
crisis is effectively a saving crisis.
As populations in Latin America and the Caribbean age, many coun-
tries face a steep road ahead to provide economic security for a growing 
number of retired adults. The design and performance of pension sys-
tems will be crucial to ensure that enough resources are provided to 
the elderly, without compromising growth and the prospects of future 
generations.
Policymakers around the world are struggling with this trade-off 
between generations. Latin America and the Caribbean faces particular 
challenges, ranging from high inequality, low coverage, and lack of pen-
sion adequacy (Bosch, Melguizo, and Pagés, 2013) to fiscal sustainability 
(Gill, Packard, and Yermo, 2005).
Preparing Latin American and Caribbean countries will require not 
only more and better savings, but also important changes in the way 
individuals and countries think about work life and retirement. This will 
not be easy. Pension systems are deeply embedded in the architecture 
of the welfare state and even the constitutional design of some coun-
tries. There are intense ideological divides as to which system best 
provides pensions, how to finance them, how much risk individuals 
should assume, and how much income redistribution to lower-income 
people is needed within and across generations.
Unfortunately, in most Latin American and Caribbean countries, sys-




thoroughly rethought to ensure that the great majority of elderly have 
an adequate pension in the future without compromising other develop-
ment objectives. When it comes to saving for the future, pensions are at 
the center of the debate.
Newer Systems for Older Populations
Over the past three decades, reforms have led to a variety of pension 
systems in the region. Most countries in the region have a defined-ben-
efit system, usually PAYG (only some partially funded). Nine countries 
have defined-contribution systems, which usually coexist with some 
defined-benefit pillar. Despite these reforms, one thing is clear: contrib-
utory pension systems will not provide income security to most Latin 
American and Caribbean citizens in their old age. Only 45 percent of 
workers in the region contribute to a pension system, many of them irreg-
ularly (see Chapter 6). This is particularly true among the self-employed, 
low-income workers, young workers, and women. Therefore, coverage 
through these systems is and will remain limited without further reforms.
How benefits are determined and financed seems to have little 
impact on the participation of workers in the system. Regardless of the 
type of system, social security coverage is low (Bosch, Melguizo, and 
Pagés, 2013). Low coverage is rooted in the fact that most systems were 
designed to cover only salaried employees, leaving the self-employed 
outside the system. Moreover, many firms do not register their employ-
ees. Preparing pension systems for the future will require expanding 
coverage. However, other challenges need to be addressed as well—
some of them before extending coverage. These range from building up 
savings to ensure the systems’ long-term sustainability to improving pub-
lic information about pensions and how they work. Some issues will be 
more acute under one pension system than another, and countries will 
have to respond differently, depending on how pensions are determined 
and financed. Consequently, the characteristics of the system will matter.
PAYG/Defined-Benefit Systems: Promises, Promises
All pension systems in the world were initially designed as defined-ben-
efit systems—either partially funded or fully unfunded, pay-as-you-go 
schemes (referred to here as PAYG/DB). This has important implications 
for national savings. From the perspective of workers, this arrangement 
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looks very much like savings. The government takes part of their salary 
(around 15 percent, on average, in the region), and puts it away, prevent-
ing the worker from using those resources for consumption. However, 
that money is immediately spent to pay for current pensions, so govern-
ments are not saving in a pure PAYG system. Moreover, workers are not 
saving at all; they are just buying the promise of a future pension.
PAYG/DB systems generally offer contributors some positive fea-
tures. They provide insurance against changes in returns (the pension 
does not depend on the return of any specific asset), and against 
longevity (the pension provides an annuity until the end of the bene-
ficiary’s life). In a solvent PAYG/DB system, the return to the “saving” 
implied by participation in the system is the same as the growth rate 
of the wage bill.
Two additional characteristics of these systems are particularly 
important and determine most of the challenges they will face in the 
future. First, for their long-term sustainability, they depend dramati-
cally on the ratio of contributors to pensioners (as pensions are financed 
with current contributions). Thus, in an aging world, the parameters 
that determine benefits in PAYG systems must be changed periodi-
cally and sustainability must be monitored. Unfortunately, few systems 
do this, which partially transfers these risks back to individuals at some 
point. Second, there is substantial implicit redistribution within the sys-
tem, since the benefit rules do not perfectly match contributions with 
benefits. Understanding this redistribution is crucial to evaluating the 
performance of these systems. For instance, since longevity is largely 
linked to wealth, any pension system could be considered regressive, 
as relatively rich individuals enjoy longer lives (National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2015). In Latin America and the 
Caribbean the effect is magnified because high-income workers are 
most likely to qualify for the generous rules offered by DB pension sys-
tems. Main challenges for PAYG/DB systems include aspects related 
to sustainability, adequacy, and redistribution, as well as institutional 
arrangements.
Sustainability
The region spends a lot on pensions, despite low coverage and a rel-
atively young population (see Box 7.1). Although measuring pension 
spending is not as easy and transparent as it should be, the orders of 
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BOX 7.1.  HOW MUCH IS SPENT ON PENSIONS TODAY?
This chapter reports several measures of pension spending. Methodology and 
coverage vary across studies. As can be seen in Figure B7.1, although there is 
some disparity among sources, the orders of magnitude are clear. High-cover-
age countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay spend more than 6 percent 
of GDP on pensions, while Central American countries with relatively young 
populations and low coverage spend between 1 and 2 percent of GDP.
Pension spending may very well be the largest single expenditure line in 
the budgets of many governments around the world. On average, it represents 
18 percent of government expenditure in OECD countries (OECD, 2015a).
It is remarkably difficult to figure out how much many Latin American 
and Caribbean countries spend on pensions. It is even more difficult to pre-
dict how much these countries will have to spend on pensions in the future. 
This report draws on primary data (administrative records and government 
(continued on next page)
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on ECLAC (2015b);  Bebczuk (2015a); IDB’s fiscal data-
base; household surveys; and other sources, including fiscal sector and country economists of 
the Inter-American Development Bank and Lustig, Pessino, and Scott (2014). Specific country 
sources include, for Argentina, Lustig and Pessino (2013); for Bolivia, Paz Arauco et al. (2014); 
for Brazil, Higgins and Pereira (2014); for Chile, Ruiz-Tagle and Contreras (2014); for Colombia, 
Meléndez (2014); for Costa Rica, Sauma and Trejos (2014); for Ecuador, Llerena Pinto et al. 
(2015); for El Salvador, Beneke, Lustig, and Oliva (2015); for Guatemala, Cabrera, Lustig, and 
Morán (2015); for Mexico, Scott (2014); for Peru, Jaramillo (2014); for Uruguay, Bucheli and 
others (2014). 
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magnitude of pension spending in the region are on par with, if not 
greater than, pension spending in high-spending, advanced European 
countries such as France, Greece, Italy, and Spain.
Argentina and Uruguay, which have relatively high coverage (and a 
relatively older population by Latin American and Caribbean standards), 
spend about the same as France, Greece, Italy, and Spain, and spend 
significantly more than low-spending OECD countries such as Canada, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States (Figure 7.1). Because current 
demographics vary widely (Figure 7.1, panel a), these levels are perhaps 
better illustrated by comparing what OECD countries were spending 
when their demographics resembled those of Argentina and Uruguay 
(Figure 7.1, panel b). Back in 1980 (the earliest year for which compara-
ble data on pension spending are available), France and Italy had similar 
demographics to Uruguay today and were spending slightly more than 
Uruguay is spending today. Similarly, Argentina’s demographics and 
spending resembled Spain’s in 1980, and pension expenditures were 
almost identical.1
budgets) and secondary data (household surveys) to grasp the fiscal burden 
countries face in meeting their pension commitments.
Why is it so difficult to obtain reliable information on the amount coun-
tries in the region spend on pensions? First, pension regimes within countries 
are often quite fragmented. Some countries have different regimes for public 
and private employees. Some countries have occupational regimes for teach-
ers, the military, and public servants. Peru has 14 different pension regimes. 
Large federal countries like Brazil and Mexico not only have public federal 
systems, but also systems for state public employees, and even (in the case of 
Brazil) municipal governments. Second, data are not centralized in most coun-
tries. The labor histories of many workers are still recorded with paper-based 
systems or are undocumented. Contributors often must provide documents 
or witnesses to certify the contributions they have made during their entire 
active working age. Third and more importantly, few countries have an ac-
countability mandate that forces them to make spending on pensions more 
transparent and easier to scrutinize. Few legal and institutional settings sys-
tematically require countries to publish information on pension spending in 
a centralized manner, accounting for all the special regimes and subnational 
governments. It is even rarer to find information about the actuarial long-term 
financial situation of pension funds. This type of calculation requires informa-
tion that might not be available or sufficiently well organized.
BOX 7.1. (continued)
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Brazil deserves special mention. In 2015, some 8 percent of its popu-
lation was aged 65 and over. Yet its spending on pensions was similar to 
what France and Italy were spending in the 1980s, and they were much 
older at that time (with 14 percent of the population 65 and older). Esti-
mates by Clements et al. (2011) suggest that, if unreformed, Brazil will be 
spending 16 percent of GDP on pensions in 2050.2
Figure 7.1  Pension Spending and Aging in Select Latin American and 
Caribbean and OECD Countries, 2011–13
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IDB’s Labor Markets and Social Security System Indicators 
database, OECD (2014b), CELADE (2015), and United Nations (2015).
Note: Pension spending in Latin America and the Caribbean is calculated by multiplying average pen-
sions by the share of pension recipients using household surveys. 
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Pension spending is lower in most other countries in the region, 
thanks more to lack of coverage than adequate sustainability. Most 
countries spend between 1.5 and 4 percent of GDP on pensions. If coun-
tries enjoyed relatively higher coverage, the fiscal picture would look 
very different. A simple simulation in which countries achieve 75 percent 
coverage providing the minimum mandated pension to those who do 
not have a pension today, would significantly elevate costs and put many 
countries on the spending level of countries like Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, (low-spending OECD countries) with 
much younger populations (Figure 7.1, panel c).
This spending is not backed up by contributions and, in some cases, 
such large expenditures go to a very small portion of the elderly popu-
lation. Despite the relative youth of countries, some PAYG/DB systems 
cannot cover pension spending with contributions and must fund them 
with additional government revenue (Figure 7.2). Pension imbalances in 
Argentina and Brazil already absorb more than 1 percent of GDP. Coun-
tries that reformed their systems partially or totally like Colombia, El 
Salvador, or the Dominican Republic during the 1980s and 1990s face 
significant deficits during their transition periods.
Figure 7.2  Difference between Contributions and Benefits in Select PAYG/DB 
Systems
Pension balance as a share of GDP
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Source: Authors’ calculations; Colombia (Bosch et al., 2015), Barbados public sector workers (Eckler, 
2014), Brazil, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Guatemala (IDB’s fiscal database), for Brazil 
general regime (Ministry of Social Security, Brazil), Jamaica private sector (Hall, 2014).
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In Caribbean countries like Barbados and Jamaica, the public PAYG/
DB pension systems for private sector workers are more in balance, but 
actuarial reviews (see Box 7.2) point to upcoming deficits that will require 
substantial reforms. Public sector schemes in Barbados, although already 
reformed, still absorb almost 3 percentage points of GDP directly from 
general revenues. Other relatively younger countries with very low cov-
erage, such as Honduras and Nicaragua, still pay out less to beneficiaries 
than what they collect in their mandatory pension systems.
BOX 7.2. MANDATORY INDEPENDENT ACTUARIAL REVIEWS
Long-term commitments of PAYG/DB plans should be followed closely; thus 
sustainability should be adequately monitored. Given the impact of demo-
graphic changes on liabilities, actuarial studies are required. This type of 
assessment considers the parameters of the model, projections of contribu-
tions and pension payments, and the evolution of any reserves. In terms of 
contributions, the number of workers depends significantly on the number 
of working-age people in the future, labor market participation, and wage 
growth. In terms of pension payments, a critical variable is the number of 
people who retire and how long they will live. Projections also depend on fu-
ture rates of return for any reserves.
While these studies are very important, technical robust analysis is not 
always possible because of lack of information. One very important piece of 
information is life expectancy, with projections of mortality for the long term. 
Many countries use life expectancy tables based on other countries, like Chile 
or the United States. Another important source of information needed to 
project the growth of the system is the history of contributions, which is not 
always complete.
In Jamaica, an actuarial analysis is required by law every five years. The last 
actuarial study was finished in March 2013. The National Insurance Scheme 
in Jamaica is a PAYG/DB system that is partially funded. According to the 
2013 study, reserves in the base scenario will be depleted by 2033. The study 
proposes specific measures to extend sustainability. The government is con-
sidering alternatives to proactively improve the system’s long-term financial 
stance.
In Barbados, an actuarial analysis is required every three years. This review 
has helped bring about adjustments in the parameters of the pension system. 
For instance, in 2002, to address medium-term sustainability problems, con-
tribution rates were increased to 20 percent of wages and the retirement age 
was increased to 67 by 2018 (it is currently 66). Despite these reforms, the 
2008 actuarial review projects that contributions will be sufficient to cover all 
expenditures only up to 2022, and that the fund will be completely depleted 
by 2068.
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These pension imbalances also illustrate a critical characteristic of 
PAYG/DB systems: the parameters that are supposed to balance contri-
butions and benefits adjust very slowly to changes in demographics. In 
principle, minor imbalances in PAYG/DB systems could be fixed by fine-
tuning parameters such as retirement ages or contribution rates. However, 
changing these parameters tends to be very unpopular and is rarely done 
unless a fiscal crisis is imminent, or they can be made very slowly.
Without reforms, these imbalances of PAYG systems will worsen in 
the decades to come, increasing fiscal pressure, drawing down future 
government resources (dissaving), and shrinking resources available for 
other important areas like education or infrastructure. Not only are these 
systems an inadequate saving mechanism for individuals, the pressure 
they place on government finances compromises public saving as well. 
The countries that switched to defined contribution systems will even-
tually reduce their deficits, but in the short term these imbalances are 
exacerbated and budget pressures will persist for many decades.3
Adequacy and Redistribution
Some of the sustainability problems stem from the generosity of bene-
fits for those covered by the system. In general, in Latin America and the 
Caribbean the rules determining pensions in the PAYG/DB systems are 
very generous compared even to richer countries, especially for workers 
who have contributed for many years. This does not necessarily mean 
that pensions are high for all retirees.
The generosity of the system is determined by how much a ben-
eficiary (and a beneficiary’s dependents) will receive compared to 
how much they contributed. These two seemingly easy concepts are 
not easy to quantify and are influenced by parameters such as retire-
ment age, contribution rates, the benefit rule, the survivors benefit, and 
other less-obvious factors such as wage growth or the interest rate 
assumed (see Berstein, Bosch, and Oliveri, 2016). Around one-half of 
the average pension in PAYG/DB systems in the region is not financed 
by contributions and will have to be subsidized by the government if 
parameters of the system remain unchanged. In some countries, up to 
75 percent of the pension is subsidized. This subsidy must be financed 
by general revenues.
However, most of the generous benefits implicit in PAYG/DB sys-
tems are currently accrued by higher-income pensioners. This is a direct 
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consequence of the inequality in coverage. Perversely, benefit rules, 
combined with low coverage, sometimes result in redistribution from 
low-income workers to high-income workers. If rules stipulate that retir-
ees who did not contribute a minimum number of years (vesting period) 
are not entitled to a pension, in many cases workers who did not con-
tribute or contributed to the system for just a few years do not receive a 
pension benefit (Berstein and Puente, 2015). For instance, in Colombia’s 
PAYG/DB pillar, around 65 percent of workers that have contributed to 
pensions will not qualify for a pension (Bosch et al., 2015). Thus, their 
contributions are paying for, or “subsidizing,” benefits that will flow to 
high-income workers. Some 80 percent of all subsidies in Colombia’s 
PAYG system flow to the richest 20 percent (Lasso, 2006).
Institutional Arrangements
Despite the large amount of public resources that PAYG/DB systems 
require, transparency and sustainability monitoring are limited. For 
some countries it is difficult to know exactly how much is being spent on 
pensions, because of the multiplicity of systems and subnational levels. 
Furthermore, lack of data or the inability to process it, makes it diffi-
cult for many countries to foresee or estimate future liabilities. very few 
countries have a clear protocol to undertake sustainability monitoring 
or the capability to implement it. This, in turn, impairs the policy debate 
and hampers efforts to fashion an agenda for reform. Some countries 
are taking advantage of sustainability monitoring and are making prog-
ress in implementing parametric reforms to their systems; at the same 
time, they are raising public awareness by communicating the financial 
stance of pension systems.
Transparency and governance are relatively weak in the region. 
Souto and Musalem (2012) developed a Transparency and Governance 
Index (TGI) for National Public Pension Funds and ranked 83 countries, 
including 14 Latin American and Caribbean countries.4 No country in 
the region was in the top 10; the highest-ranked countries were Mex-
ico and Costa Rica, with 22 out of 33 points. Weak governance is an 
important issue, as it can impair the investment performance of pen-
sion funds (Yang and Mitchell, 2008; Hess, 2005). Policymakers always 
face short-term demands; strong institutions must be able to withstand 
such pressure and prepare societies for the eventuality of increasing 
longevity.
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Recommendations
Lack of coverage is the main challenge faced by pension systems. 
This will increase pressure to relax access to benefits (Bosch and Oli-
veri, 2015) or establish noncontributory pensions (discussed later in this 
chapter) to alleviate poverty in old age. Under this scenario, increasing 
coverage while monitoring the sustainability of PAYG/DB systems would 
become even more critical.
Three general principles guide possible reforms:
• Rethink fundamental parameters to adapt to the demographic 
change.
To deal with the demographic transition, PAYG/DB systems need 
to adjust their fundamental parameters. How and when will be 
a matter of preference and political will, but inevitably these 
reforms will have to address benefit rules, retirement ages, and 
contribution rates. Systems that adjust sooner rather than later 
could distribute the impact of longevity in a more equitable way 
across generations. Given high levels of labor informality, rais-
ing contribution rates does not seem as viable an option as in 
developed countries. Automatic adjustments to demographic 
changes (for instance, indexation of retirement to longevity every 
five years) are preferable to swift reforms. A number of OECD 
countries, including Spain, have followed this path. Others have 
established a so-called Notional Defined Contribution arrange-
ment, in which benefits depend on the entire working life, interest 
rates, and longevity, as in the case of Italy (OECD, 2014).
• Build reserves whenever possible.
Public, defined benefit systems can save for the future (fund 
the system). Actuarial studies need to determine the level of 
assets required to assure that future liabilities would be cov-
ered. Regulators of defined benefit systems usually require 
minimum levels of funding, which in some cases is 100 percent, 
as in the Netherlands (IOPS, 2012). Building reserves imposes 
a challenge in terms of how they are invested. Accumulated 
savings should be aimed at increasing growth and productiv-
ity. Adequate regulation, sound investment policies, and good 
governance are needed to pursue long-term objectives. Appro-
priate management of assets and liabilities should be the main 
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driver of decisions. Countries like Norway (Government Pension 
Fund) and Chile (Pension Reserves Fund) created special funds 
to finance their PAYG systems. Adequate governance is crucial 
for such arrangements.
• Improve information and increase public awareness.
Reforms will be better informed and implemented if informa-
tion is available and the consequences of action or inaction are 
explicit. Improving data collection and dissemination, periodic 
independent actuarial analysis, continuous policy debate, public 
awareness campaigns, and transparency are requisites to imple-
ment reforms.
Defined Contribution Systems: A Work in Progress
Faced with the fiscal imbalances of the PAYG/DB systems, many coun-
tries switched to defined contribution systems pioneered by Chile in 1981 
and followed by eight other countries in the 1990s (World Bank, 1994). 
In contrast to the PAYG/DB systems, in fully funded defined contribu-
tion (FF/DC) systems, workers’ contributions are saved in an account 
and invested. Unlike PAYG/DB systems, these are real savings that are 
invested. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, transition from one system 
to another risks exacerbating some preexisting imbalances for a long 
period of time.
With the transition to DC systems, some challenges remained while 
new ones emerged. First, coverage did not improve. In the transition to 
DC systems, the hope was that coverage rates would increase. These 
expectations did not materialize, in large part because nothing intrinsi-
cally changed in the labor market (the cause of low coverage). The main 
challenge for FF/DC remains increasing coverage.
A second significant challenge for FF/DC systems relates to the 
provision of longevity insurance. In a DC arrangement the retiree can 
withdraw all funds at once, schedule withdrawals for the retirement 
period, or purchase an annuity. The only way the retiree is insured against 
outliving his savings (one of the main objectives of pension systems) is 
by purchasing an annuity, something that less than half of pensioners in 
these systems are doing today.
Third, a crucial challenge for these systems is to assure efficiency in 
terms of returns and costs, which in many cases depends on competi-
tion among providers. Given the lack of knowledge and engagement by 
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participants, competition among providers does not necessarily resolve 
the problem.
A number of countries that launched defined contribution systems 
in the 1990s have returned to the PAYG/DB systems, both within and 
beyond the region (Holzmann, 2013). Fiscal challenges in some countries 
that were phasing in transition costs paved the way for these reversals. 
Defined contribution systems were advertised to people as a means of 
receiving higher pensions with lower contribution rates. The fact that 
people were not receiving benefits in line with their expectations also 
eroded support for continuing the reforms.
Still other important pending issues include financing the cost of 
transition; encouraging better investments, increasing returns, and low-
ering operation costs; enhancing the offer of retirement products and 
insurance arrangements; building financial literacy, legitimacy, and con-
fidence; and appropriate regulation and supervision.
Transition Costs
While the 1990s reforms will be helpful in the long-term sustainability of 
countries, they entail large transition costs that could last for decades. 
The short-term fiscal situation is particularly worrisome for these coun-
tries. In transitioning to a defined contribution system with individual 
accounts, these countries lost all or a significant part of contributions to 
the old PAYG/DB system, while still facing significant pension outlays. 
Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador still dedicate 
between 1 and 4 percentage points of GDP to pay for the system in tran-
sition. In particular Chile, which reformed its PAYG system more than 
30 years ago, is still spending three percentage points of GDP per year 
on this transition. An actuarial assessment of possible transition costs 
should be part of any reform effort.
Investments, Returns, and Costs
Pensions in defined contribution systems depend on investment returns 
and management cost. A 1 percent return over 40 years translates into 
a 20 percent increase in pension payments. Therefore, the quality of 
investments is critical because of the direct impact of returns on pen-
sion financing (Davis, 2002). There is also an indirect impact through 
the effect that institutional investors, such as pension funds, can have 
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on economic performance. This positive impact would depend not only 
on how much of these pension funds are invested, but also on how these 
resources are invested.
Thus, investment regulation and pension fund supervision are 
important and have an impact on the performance of managers. Indeed, 
pension funds could be an essential source of long-term financing that 
could enhance countries’ productivity. Since pension fund investment 
needs to be well protected and oriented to financing future pensions, 
structuring financial products that would enhance development in the 
region could be a winning strategy (see Chapter 4).
On the other hand, funds could be invested in government bonds to 
finance current government spending and would thus have little impact 
on aggregate savings and growth promotion. On average,  almost 50 
percent of pension funds in the region are invested in government 
bonds; this level is as high as 80 percent in countries like El Salvador 
(Figure 7.3). Investment restrictions might affect the efficiency of invest-
ment and lower returns for a given risk level. Restrictions on variable 
income and foreign investment during the first years of the 1980s reform 
in Chile suppressed pension fund earnings by 10 percent, compared to a 
scenario with no restrictions (Berstein and Chumacero, 2006). There is 
certainly a role for regulation in aligning the incentives of pension fund 
Figure 7.3 Investment Portfolio of Private Funds 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Federación Internacional de Administradoras de Fondos de 
Pensiones (FIAP) statistics (FIAP, 2015).
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managers with the long-term objectives of pension funds; however, reg-
ulators must consider the cost embedded in any restrictions.
Even though the pension portfolios of most Latin American and 
Caribbean countries with FF/DC pension systems are not well diversi-
fied, rates of return have been high compared to other regions. However, 
volatility has also been high, especially during the past few years 
(Figure 7.4). Real returns from 2004 to 2014 were positive, on average, 
despite significant losses during and following the 2008 crisis. Peru had 
the highest real return (8.51 percent), and Bolivia had the lowest (1.81 
percent), followed closely by El Salvador (1.83 percent). The unweighted 
average for these nine countries was close to 5 percent. Among OECD 
countries, Chile and Mexico are above the average with the seventh 
and ninth highest real rate of return from 2004 to 2014 (OECD, 2015c).
Colombia and the Dominican Republic exceeded all OECD countries.
As pension funds increase and represent a significant share of GDP, 
investments must be further diversified. As strict quantitative investment 
restrictions are relaxed, it will become more important to adopt a “prudent 
person” approach for regulation, implementing best practices in terms of 
corporate governance, so that the responsibilities in making investment 
decisions would be adequately defined and decision-making processes 
established and supported (OECD, 2009). Moreover, the potentially 
Figure 7.4 Real Rate of Return of Pension Funds, 2004–2014
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significant volatility in pension fund portfolios, which may pay off in terms 
of returns, might affect contributors who are close to retirement. Differ-
ent funds with a life cycle approach to investments could provide better 
protection for future retirees (Berstein, Fuentes, and villatoro, 2013). This 
strategy has been followed by Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.
Management costs could also absorb significant resources. Thus, 
increasing efficiency could be important. Different pension arrangements 
have different types and amounts of costs. Under privately managed 
pension systems, some measure of the costs is possible, but even in this 
case, costs are difficult to compare across countries. Differences include 
the terms of the services provided by each country, the fee structure, the 
explicit and implicit charges, and pension system maturities.
Despite these considerations, Ionescu and Robles (2014) calculate 
charge ratios—the percentage paid in fees over the working life, at the 
end of a 20- or 40-year period—for 37 countries. Overall, charges are 
significant in all Latin American and Caribbean countries, averaging 18 
percent for the region.5 Nevertheless, the average charge ratios for coun-
tries outside the region is higher: 23 percent, for a 40-year horizon. Costs 
are relevant, but they vary significantly across countries. Given the impact 
of costs on pensions, an effort should be made to promote efficiency.
various countries in the region have tried to increase competition 
and reduce costs. Chile and Peru have successfully incorporated a bid-
ding process that assigns workers that enter the labor market to the 
lower fee pension fund manager. In Chile, the three bidding processes 
have brought the average charge ratio down almost 30 percent, from 
16.4 percent in 2009 to 11.6 percent as of December 2015. Other coun-
tries, including Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and El 
Salvador, have adopted fee ceilings. In these countries the amount effec-
tively charged by managers is equivalent to or very close to the cap. 
Setting caps at an appropriate level is difficult for regulators since it lim-
its competition and can end up being too high or too low.
Retirement Products and Insurance Arrangements
Despite relatively high average returns, one of the main problems of DC 
systems is that they are not providing actual pensions for a large num-
ber of workers. Part of the explanation resides in the very low savings 
of many workers who move in and out of the labor market and can-
not make any contributions for long periods (see Chapter 6). If these 
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workers are not entitled to a minimum pension or other subsidy, they 
must take their savings as a lump sum, as do 82 percent of the workers 
who reach retirement age in Colombia (Bosch et al., 2015), or in monthly 
installments until their funding is exhausted, as in Chile.
Even where savings for a pension are sufficient, FF/DC pension 
systems generally offer a choice at retirement between a phased with-
drawal and an annuity. Thus, in effect, many pensioners do not have 
longevity insurance (Bodie, 1990).6 For those that can choose a pension 
product, only 60 percent of the pensioners in Peru, 51 percent in Chile, 
and 11 percent in Colombia are insured against longevity risk (Berstein, 
Morales, and Puente, 2015). For phased withdrawal products offered in 
DC systems in the region, the pension is computed as self-insurance; the 
amount withdrawn is expected to last for the rest of the retiree’s life. 
Eventually, if savings are not sufficient, and if the person lives longer 
than expected, or returns are lower than assumed, the person might end 
up depleting all of her savings before passing away. By contrast, annui-
ties are insurance products that pool idiosyncratic risk. The amount of 
the pension is fixed for life; beneficiaries receive a certain amount inde-
pendent of how long they live or how interest rates fluctuate, or even 
how inflation varies in some cases. An insurance company covers these 
risks for a premium (Milevsky, 2013).
In spite of these desirable properties of annuities, they present 
important challenges across the world. In general, annuity markets are 
small and annuities are expensive. Asymmetric information can lead to 
high costs, which in turn implies that only high-risk individuals would buy 
the product and boost the costs even higher (Finkelstein and Poterba, 
2004). PAYG/DB schemes avoid this problem because the entity pro-
moting the plan assumes the longevity risk. Nonetheless, in systems with 
full compulsory annuitization, incentives to contribute could be lower 
since contributors are less likely to get back what they contributed dur-
ing their working life (Milevsky, 2015). Partial or deferred annuitization 
could attain the goal of longevity insurance in a more effective way 
(OECD, 2012; Berstein, Morales, and Puente, 2015).
Another feature that distinguishes FF/DC systems is that a contrib-
utor will always receive the actuarial accumulated balance as a pension 
or a lump sum, if the balance is too small. This differs from PAYG/DB 
systems, in which a person who contributed for few periods, or did 
not comply with other requirements, does not receive a benefit, or 
receives only a refund of the amount contributed adjusted for inflation. 
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A drawback of these lump sum payments is that they do not provide for 
longevity insurance, but can seem attractive because they seem large 
compared to the lifetime pension payment. Even if the pension implies 
a significant subsidy (because of the minimum pension guarantees in 
some DC schemes), some people are willing to choose a lump sum.7
Increased longevity will affect DC systems, particularly the level of 
pensions and how they are financed. Increased life expectancy is cer-
tainly good news, but it has significantly reduced a main source of 
pension financing in the past: mortality credits, which are the unspent 
funds when someone passes away. The probability of reaching the retire-
ment age—which continues to be 60 in many countries—is more than 
90 percent or higher in many countries. Thus, most people will require a 
retirement benefit and receive payment for more years than in the early 
1930s. After age 80 or 85, the likelihood of living one more year declines 
and continues to decline at a rapid pace as the person ages (See Box 7.3). 
Therefore, for ages beyond this threshold, risk pooling continues to be an 
important source of financing for benefits, as it was for ages 60 and over 
in the 1930s. Therefore, savings are required to finance a very likely retire-
ment event, and at that stage, having insurance for the very long term 
becomes valuable. Taking advantage of old age mortality credits could 
BOX 7.3. FINANCING PENSIONS: MORTALITY CREDITS
In the early 1930s, when retirement programs such as the U.S. social security 
system were launched, the probability of reaching 60 years old, the normal re-
tirement age in many countries at that time, was extremely low. Life expectancy 
at birth in European countries was around 60 years old, and it was significantly 
lower in Latin America and the Caribbean. Therefore, when pension systems 
started around the world, the schemes resembled an insurance product. Every 
worker paid an insurance premium during his or her working life. In the unlikely 
event that he or she reached the retirement age, the benefit would substitute 
for the labor income she had paid into the system until she passed away. The 
average retirement period for the few that reached the retirement age of 60 
was 13 or 14 years. Thus, contributions paid by numerous workers could finance 
pensions for a small number of retirees. An important source of funds was 
mortality credits: contributions paid by members who died before they could 
collect all that they had paid into the system. This is what usually happens with 
insurance. The insurer will cover a risk, but the insurer does not end up paying 
a benefit to everyone who paid a premium. This is the essence of risk-pooling 
arrangements, and it is an efficient way of covering a risk.
(continued on next page)
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still be an important source of financing pensions, mainly at advanced old 
age. This is the insurance component, at least for the very old.
In all, for DC systems increased longevity will imply that a larger 
share of the pension will have to be financed through savings (accumula-
tion and returns) rather than through mortality credits. If the contribution 
rate and retirement age remain unchanged, pensions will be lower.
Financial Literacy, Legitimacy, and Confidence
A lack of financial knowledge in the region is hurting confidence in 
pension systems. In general, people do not expect to live as long as 
Mortality credits are a source of financing pensions, given the decreasing 
probability of living as a person ages. Those who survive longer benefit from 
the resources of those who passed away. This is basically risk pooling and tak-
ing advantage of the unknown event of who will survive longer. Figure B7.2 
shows an annuity payment in Chile that starts at age 65, and the associated 
sources of financing over time. Mortality credits became the most significant 
source after age 85. In this example, the mortality credits from the 1,000 peo-
ple alive at age 65 would finance the pensions of the 3 of them who survive to 
age 105 at the same level as they received at age 65, because they are using 
the resources of the ones who did not survive.
BOX 7.3. (continued)












Capital Return Mortality credits
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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projected by life expectancies, and therefore do not necessarily foresee 
the need for sufficient savings. In addition, many people in the region 
believe that the state should ultimately be responsible for funding pen-
sions. These beliefs make it difficult for people to understand the full 
costs of providing pensions and the consequences of short-term volatil-
ity on returns. Supervisory authorities in various jurisdictions, not just in 
the region but around the world, are working hard to improve financial 
literacy (see IOPS, 2011).
When DC pension systems were launched, the need for financial lit-
eracy on pensions was not sufficiently appreciated. In Chile, for instance, 
a survey conducted in 2002—some 21 years after the 1981 reform—
found that 78.4 percent of respondents did not know how their pension 
was determined. Among those who claimed they did know, 34 percent 
thought that it depended on their final year’s salary. Financial literacy 
did not vary much among age groups. Not until 2005 did the regulator 
require pension fund managers to send pension projections to members, 
so that they would be better informed and take timely action to improve 
their pensions. Even in 2009, almost 30 years after the reform, the Social 
Protection survey showed that most workers did not know how much they 
contributed to their pensions. Almost 75 percent of those with primary 
education and 50 percent with higher education did not know the pension 
contribution rates. Of those who said they knew, fewer than 10 percent in 
any educational level gave the correct answer for the contribution rate.
Efforts have been made to promote financial knowledge in Chile, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico, among other countries. 
In Chile, shortly after fund managers began sending saving projec-
tions, individuals began saving more (see Fajnzylber, Plaza, and Reyes, 
2009; Miranda Pinto, 2013). Mexico has established a five-year (2013–
18) Financial and Pensions Education Strategy. The pension regulator in 
Mexico—Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (CON-
SAR)—redesigned the periodic statement of pension balances to make 
it easier to understand, launched a new Web site and, as in Chile, started 
issuing individualized pension projections. Costa Rica and the Domini-
can Republic are taking similar steps.
The lack of public understanding and contributor involvement pre-
vents competition from playing the role it should to promote market 
discipline. Many contributors are not sensitive to differences in prices or 
returns between pension fund managers, which could have a huge impact 
on their return. Indeed, most people do not even know how much they 
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are charged. In Chile, the first private system in the region, 93 percent of 
members in 2002 were not aware of the fee charged.8 Under this scenario, 
sales agents play a critical role. Berstein and Cabrita (2007) found that 
workers do not switch on their own to lower-cost managers but do so if 
advised by a sales agent. This imposes additional overhead in this industry.
Appropriate Regulation and Supervision
In an FF/DC system, individuals’ decisions have an impact on their final 
pension. Good decision making requires adequate information and tools, 
but also regulation that mitigates risks. Since these systems are man-
aged by the private sector, one of the main roles of the government is to 
build confidence in the system through adequate regulation and super-
vision to mitigate excessive risk taking.
In systems where individuals can choose their own investments, the 
alternatives from which workers can choose might imply that significant 
risks could be taken. For instance, Chile has five different funds. In the 
riskiest fund, Fund A, up to 80 percent can be invested in equity; in 
the most conservative fund, Fund E, up to 5 percent can be invested in 
equity. There are three funds between these extremes (Funds B, C, and 
D) that gradually reduce exposure to equity with age from 60 percent to 
20 percent, following a life cycle approach as a default strategy. These 
act as default choices. Fund A is not available to workers who are close 
to retirement, and Funds A and B are not allowed once participants have 
retired. However, there are no restrictions on switching between funds; 
therefore, contributors close to retirement might switch from Fund E to 
B, back and forth, as they try to stop shortfalls and maximize return; this 
could also increase their risk just when they cannot afford losses.
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru also offer a choice of funds, but with 
fewer alternatives and more restrictions on switching. Each country has 
a different default. Which is the proper default? How many alternatives 
should be offered? How much freedom should be given to individuals? 
These are all issues that FF/DC systems need to address.
Whatever the regulatory setup, supervision needs to be efficient 
and effective. A risk-based supervisory approach allows resources to be 
allocated effectively, prevents problems that would impact beneficia-
ries, and proactively improves the performance of the pension industry. 
Supervisors from different jurisdictions in OECD and non-OECD coun-
tries have agreed to ten principles to guide the proper supervision of 
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pension funds. These are common to different pension systems and 
apply to both private and public systems (IOPS, 2010).
Recommendations
Moving from PAYG/DB to FF/DC does not necessarily increase either 
coverage or savings. In Latin America and the Caribbean, insufficient 
coverage remains a huge issue. Additional measures need to be taken to 
afford aging in the long run. Some general recommendations to enhance 
FF/DC schemes follow.
• Find ways to increase returns and reduce administrative costs.
Regulation needs to be dynamic and consider reforms to cap-
ital markets that allow pension funds to be invested in ways 
that boost growth in the country. Enhanced corporate gover-
nance to assure solid investment decisions is also important; this 
might strengthen the overall financial sector. As pension sys-
tems mature, investment abroad offers countries an alternative 
to achieve appropriate diversification. Countries in the region 
have tried to control costs; the impact of these efforts must be 
assessed, and further innovations may be required.
• Rethink parameters and retirement products.
As people live longer, the level of pensions will decrease if the 
retirement age remains fixed. Hence, either retirement savings 
or retirement ages should be raised. Parametric reforms are 
also needed to insure the adequacy of pensions. Retirement 
products must be consistent with the main goal of a pension 
system, which is to provide income security during retire-
ment. In some cases, the contributory and noncontributory 
pillars may need to be combined to deliver sustainable pro-
tection. For contributors who have saved enough, lump sums 
and phased withdrawals do not provide long-term longevity 
protection and do not take advantage of mortality credits as 
a source of financing. Therefore, annuity markets need to be 
developed and other longevity insurance arrangements could 
be explored to combine savings and insurance to support old 
age effectively.
• Provide sound information and financial education for 
participants.
SAvING FOR THE FUTURE: PENSION SYSTEMS 179
Information and education are important tools for workers to 
manage their future pensions. Pension fund managers should 
advise contributors during their working life, while they have 
time and opportunity to add to and improve the returns on their 
retirement savings. Managers must act in the best interest of 
their customers and communicate with them on a timely basis.
• Enhance regulation and supervision to mitigate risks and 
promote adequate pensions.
Regulation and supervision should be enhanced and constantly 
reviewed. Regulation should address the alternatives and choices 
available in FF/DC systems. Proper defaults should be put in 
place for those pension fund participants who do not want or do 
not have the knowledge to make decisions. The default strategy 
for investment that considers a life cycle with less risk exposure 
as the worker ages has shown to be appropriate (Berstein, Fuen-
tes, and villatoro, 2013). Defaults might also consider a specific 
retirement product at the time of retirement or other decisions 
that must be taken during a member’s lifetime.
Pension supervisory authorities should be guided by the 
Principles on Private Pension Supervision (IOPS, 2010). Best 
practices need to be considered and implemented. It is critical 
to prevent events that might damage confidence in pension sys-
tems. Unfortunately, issues are bound to arise, so supervisors 
must have the power to take proper action when needed, includ-
ing levying sanctions on pension fund managers.
• Promote voluntary savings.
The way systems are designed can significantly affect results. 
Automatic enrollment has been shown to be effective in New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These 
mechanisms could help workers contribute less during peri-
ods when money is very tight. Many African countries are using 
mobile phone technology to facilitate voluntary contributions. 
Aspects of these experiences may be applicable to Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean.
When All Else Fails: Noncontributory Pensions
Reforming current mandatory pension systems will not be enough. 
Greater participation in pension systems is imperative to prepare for 
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the demographic transition. However, if coverage is to be adequate, 
noncontributory pensions may inevitably be part of the answer. They 
must be carefully designed so as not to threaten the sustainability of 
benefits.
Why do so few people in the region contribute to pension systems? 
The consensus points to a combination of at least four factors.9 First, 
jobs are not productive enough to pay for the entire package of for-
mal benefits (which must cover not only pensions, but also health care, 
regulations, firing costs, and the like). Second, workers do not value 
pension contributions and try to avoid them. Third, firms try to avoid 
paying contributions since enforcement is lax. Fourth, a significant 
share of workers in the region are self-employed (around one-third of 
the labor force in the region, and as much as 70 percent in some coun-
tries); for the self-employed, pension contributions are either voluntary 
or unenforceable.10
In response to the failure of contributory pension systems to provide 
adequate coverage, so-called noncontributory pensions have become 
increasingly popular. This type of pension is not based on contributions 
but on eligibility criteria such as age, income, or area of residence. It 
is financed mostly by general taxation (although some countries like 
Colombia finance these pensions through solidarity contributions).
Noncontributory pensions are equivalent to a PAYG/DB system 
without direct contributions from the beneficiary. Thus, they will also 
be subject to the pressures of the demographic transition and the fiscal 
sustainability considerations discussed in previous sections.
This type of arrangement is not new. Most advanced countries pro-
vide some kind of pension assistance to alleviate poverty in old age, 
regardless of whether people contribute to the system. In the region, their 
importance is growing as they have become the main tool to expand cov-
erage in the last two decades. Today, noncontributory pensions account 
for one-third of pension coverage in the region. In several countries, more 
people receive noncontributory pensions than contributory pensions 
(Figure 7.5).
Perhaps the most important challenge is how to finance these pen-
sions without generating larger distortions in mandatory contribution 
systems. Currently, the design and extension of these systems vary con-
siderably in the region. Some countries, such as Bolivia, have chosen 
universal programs. Others have set up relatively modest means-tested 
programs targeted at the very poor. The generosity of benefits also 
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varies significantly, ranging from very low (between 5 percent and 7 per-
cent of income per capita) in Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Peru to 
generous programs (around 30 percent of income per capita) in Argen-
tina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago.
The choice of design will be crucial to insure coverage and fiscal 
sustainability. Today, the noncontributory pensions with the highest cov-
erage cost between 0.7 percent and 1 percent of GDP. This cost will more 
than double by 2050 if generosity and coverage remain constant, just to 
account for changes in demographics. If programs were to provide ben-
efits to adults aged 60+ at the average level of the region (17 percent of 
income per capita, which is just above the poverty line pension in many 
countries) the cost by 2050 would be between 2 percent and 3 percent 
of GDP (Figure 7.6). These pensions are absolutely necessary to increase 
coverage. But in an aging world, they will absorb ever more precious 
resources. Countries must rethink ways of financing them.
Figure 7.5  Contributory and Noncontributory Coverage in 19 Latin American 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IDB’s Labor Markets and Social Security Indicators data-
base.
Note: The division between contributory and noncontributory pensions in Argentina, Brazil, and Uru-
guay was obtained by dividing the number of beneficiaries of these programs by the number of adults 
over 65. This could be an imperfect measure in countries where the beneficiary can begin drawing a 
pension at a younger age.
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It is also important to take into account the possible effects of non-
contributory pensions on incentives to save. Household decisions are 
changing with the arrival of noncontributory pensions. The emergence 
of these pensions has yielded some very relevant insights into how 
individuals and households react to changes in benefits (see Box 7.4). 
Noncontributory pensions decrease the participation rates of benefi-
ciaries in contributory systems and, in some cases, their savings. They 
also reduce the transfers that beneficiary households receive from other 
households. Juárez (2009) finds that for every peso the government allo-
cates to an elderly adult in Mexico City, private transfers drop by 87 cents.
Recommendations
Increasing participation in mandatory pension systems will require an 
integrated approach that addresses the many causes of labor informality. 
Figure 7.6  Current and Future Fiscal Costs of Noncontributory Pensions in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 2015–50 
Current spending (percentage of GDP)
Spending with current coverage and generosity (percentage of GDP) 2050
Spending covering 50 percent of adults 60+ with average LAC generosity
(percentage of GDP) 2050
Cost of NCP as a share of GDP






















Source: Authors’ elaboration based on HelpAge International (2015) and authors’ calculations.
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However, increasing coverage without addressing the issues described 
in previous sections could worsen problems of adequacy, redistribution, 
and sustainability.
Noncontributory pensions will be an essential tool to prevent old-
age poverty and redistribute resources to the most needy in the region. 
They are necessary to increase coverage and reduce inequities in the 
pension system. However, they are not the solution in the face of demo-
graphic change, particularly if they are aimed at something more than 
poverty reduction (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005). The design and imple-
mentation of noncontributory pensions can be improved in three basic 
areas: institutions, incentives, and financing.
• Institutions
Build appropriate institutions and fully integrate them into the 
pension system. In some cases, this would require rethinking 
the institutions that manage the delivery of funds and monitor 
the fiscal sustainability of the systems, as well as adjusting the 
generosity of benefits and the eligibility age to address poverty 
alleviation and make them fiscally sustainable.
BOX 7.4. HOUSEHOLD SAVING AND NONCONTRIBUTORY PENSIONS
In the last decade, the most radical reform in the world of pensions in Latin 
America has been a relatively silent one. Noncontributory pension programs 
(NCPs) now provide coverage to more than 25 percent of the elderly. These 
programs have greatly improved the well-being of elderly adults in some cases 
(Galiani, Gertler, and Bando, 2014). However, there is concern that providing 
NCP might reduce the need for precautionary savings, and thus alter incen-
tives to work longer or contribute to pensions, even as they induce increases 
in consumption and alter saving decisions, very much like minimum pensions 
(Jiménez-Martín, 2014). By now, there is ample evidence that NCP facilitate re-
tirement in the region (Bosch, Melguizo, and Pagés, 2013) but in some instances, 
contributions to the mandatory system have declined (Bosch and Oliveri, 2015).
The impact of NCP on savings is much less studied and the evidence is 
mixed. In Argentina and Mexico, beneficiaries of NCP saved less (between 
3 and 4 percent) after noncontributory pensions were expanded (González-
Rozada and Ruffo, 2015). However, in Bolivia, some specific population groups 
(i.e. men versus women) increased household savings (Hernani-Limarino and 
Mena, 2015). In Mexico, no significant effect was found when federal and state 
noncontributory pension programs were considered (Alonso, Amuedo-Doran-
te, and Juárez, 2015).
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• Incentives
Contributory and noncontributory pensions should serve a com-
mon purpose and interaction between them should be explicitly 
considered, mainly in terms of incentives. Competition between 
them should be avoided, for instance by allowing noncontrib-
utory pensions to be combined with contributory benefits so 
that they complement each other. Conditioning the eligibility of 
noncontributory pensions only on those who do not have con-
tributory pensions is likely to generate further distortions in the 
pension system.
• Financing
Appropriate ways to finance the system must be found. Noncon-
tributory pensions are largely financed through general taxation. 
As expenses grow in the future, additional sources of funding 
will be needed.
Pensions Count
The pension deficit is essentially a savings deficit—already. Pension 
coverage is too low, households are not saving enough for retire-
ment, and some of those who are already retired are not receiving 
adequate pensions. As the region advances in its demographic tran-
sition, the situation is bound to become worse. Substantial reforms 
are needed and must be informed by a thorough reflection on the 
key objectives of pension systems and how to better finance them. 
Countries with PAYG/DB systems need to build up saving funds 
(accumulating excess contributions) while the number of retirees is 
still low compared to the working-age population, and put in place 
the mechanisms to adapt to the demographic transition. Sometimes, 
this will imply tough decisions about retirement conditions. In coun-
tries that have switched—or are planning to switch—to fully funded, 
defined-contribution systems based on individual accounts, a num-
ber of remaining issues put into doubt the ability of these systems 
to provide adequate pensions. Insuring participants against risks, 
increasing returns, and improving confidence in these systems are 
all paramount. Of course, coverage is and will be one of the key con-
cerns in all systems. The importance of pension systems will only 
increase in an aging world. Proper design, implemented in a timely 
fashion, could make the difference.
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Increasing pension saving is a necessary step to resolve the region’s 
saving deficit, but it is not enough. As the population greys, it will be 
necessary to defy demographic forces and increase returns to be able to 
provide more with less. With pensions, as with other forms of saving, the 
region needs more and better saving. In the case of pensions, “better” 
means that the accumulated savings must be invested well, provid-
ing the highest possible returns to retirees and enhancing productivity 
and growth. This is not an easy task, but it is an important one. It is the 
responsibility of regulators and other policymakers to provide adequate 
regulation and supervision to encourage better pension saving.
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Notes
1 This exercise uses pension spending derived from household surveys.
2 By 2100, pensions could escalate to almost 50 percent of GDP if Brazil 
maintains the same per capita spending on pensions.
3 See Bosch et al. (2015) for the case of Colombia.
4 The TGI is composed of two sub-indices, namely the Transparency 
Index (TI) and the Governance Index (GI). The former includes five 
elements: Web site, annual report, communication, information com-
pleteness, and name of responsible person. The latter comprises six 
elements: governing body, selection and appointment, external con-
trol, investment committee, market experts, and code of conduct (see 
Musalem and Souto [2009] for a detailed description of each of these 
components). Data used are from 2007.
5 Fees on total final assets represent a larger part of the fund when 
the fee structure is an annual percentage of the fund and a longer 
period is considered. This is because when the pension fund manager 
charges the same annual fee over assets and accumulated assets are 
larger, the total amount becomes very significant. These fees could 
reasonably be expected to fall over time. This analysis assumes they 
are constant.
6 Longevity risk covers a worker/insured who lives longer than expected 
and runs the risk of exhausting accumulated funds.
7 Bosch et al. (2015) describe this situation in Colombia.
8 Subsecretaría de Previsión Social [Undersecretariat of Social Secu-
rity] (2002).
9 See Rofman and Oliveri (2012); Bosch, Melguizo, and Pagés (2013).
10 For further analysis, see Bosch, Melguizo, and Pagés (2013) and 
Alaimo et al. (2015).
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